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 On Truth and Instrumentalisation 
 Chris Henry 
 
 
Two issues were raised in discussion at the 2015 London Conference 
in Critical Thought that I will address here. The first issue was that of 
the nature of truth as a source of legitimation. In his paper, Jones 
showed that 6FKPLWW·V political theology conceptualises political 
legitimacy as derived from ¶VHFXODULVHG theological FRQFHSWV· 1  Yet 
Jones re-injects the theological into these secularised concepts: for 
him, politics is constituted by a leader who appeals to a legitimating 
power as justification for their own leadership, whilst those ¶XQGHU· 
this leadership also necessarily submit to the same authority. Jones 
develops his theory of politics in this article by conceptualising truth as 
a disruption of ¶FHUWDLQ DEVROXWHV· by political leaders, founded upon 
this secularised yet nonetheless theological idea of legitimation. As 
presented at the conference, my reading of Badiou places him in a 
similar position to Jones; whereas Jones used both explicitly Christian 
and secular theological terminology to locate political authority in the 
divine, Badiou uses a particular configuration of mathematics 
(specifically Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZFC) set theory) to locate truth in the 
void. Mathematics, according to Badiou, is the language of ontology 
itself and articulates truth within the world as a ruptural break from 
the standard order of things.2 Both authors therefore wish to explain 
the axiomatic by which we can tell the truth of situations, but cannot 
explain the truth of this condition of truth. The first problem can be 
condensed thus: what can tell us the truth of God, or the truth of 
mathematics, upon which so much justification relies? 
The second issue raised was that of circularity, or the self-
referential nature of truth claims. Jones was asked whether or not the 
necessity on the part of the truth teller to proclaim the legitimacy of 
God undermined the idea of God as sacred. It seems that the secular 
justification of the authority of God is, in fact, a profane justification 
                                                 
1 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
2 A. Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2011), 15. 
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that simply presupposes the divine authority of God. Likewise, when 
Badiou argues that the subject pays fidelity to an event in order to 
actualise its lessons in subsequent situations as truths, he presupposes 
the (mathematical) conditions of the event. Both authors therefore 
conceptualise truth through circular reasoning: truth is articulated by 
one who proclaims fidelity to a presupposition (i.e. God or 
mathematics) which then authorises their proclamation post hoc. My 
argument, however, as an alternative for %DGLRX·V and -RQHV· was also 
challenged for its circularity. In my conference paper, I argued that 
¶FRQFHSWV are truthful for Deleuze as long as they express an HYHQW· 
where an event is understood as a qualitative or quantitative change in 
the state of affairs.3 On this basis, when Deleuze joins Nietzsche in 
claiming that objects do not exist separately from their expression, he 
removes the mind/body duality that underpins conventional theories 
of truth and the aletheiatic theories of both Jones and Badiou.4 For 
Deleuze, neither the mind, nor language (nor, therefore, truths) refer, 
cohere nor correspond to a mind-independent world. Instead, 
following Spinoza, the world and the mind are expressions of a single 
univocal event and it makes no sense to say that one can adequately 
refer to another. 5  Because Deleuze discounts a mind-independent 
                                                 
3 See G. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy; Spinoza (London and New York: Zone Books, 
1992). See also J. Williams, "If Not Here, Then Where? On the Location and Individuation 
of Events in Badiou and Deleuze." Deleuze Studies 3(1), 2009, 106. In the Ethics, Spinoza is at 
pains to demonstrate both that the ¶RUGHU and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of WKLQJV· and that both thought and extension are expressions of God 
(which is the same as nature) (See Spinoza, Ethics: Treatise on The Emendation of the Intellect and 
Selected Letters (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Pub. Co, 1992), Ic25, II, 28)). On this 
basis, for Deleuze, concepts can be true only if they have been created as part of a material 
change, as opposed to being the result of a formal (i.e. mathematical) operation. Formal 
operations specify their conditions, the truth of which they cannot account for, and thus fall 
foul of the first problem outlined above. 
4 F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014, § 13. 
5 For this reason, it does not make sense to formally differentiate between truth and 
truthfulness (i.e. saying something true or saying something sincerely believed) with regards 
to 'HOHX]H·V philosophy. As MacKenzie explains, ¶LI the event is that which makes sense 
possible in the first place >«@ the meaning of events will never be given by reference to a 
predetermined ideal of how sense relates to HYHQWV· (I. MacKenzie, and S. Malesevic, Ideology 
After Poststructuralism (London and Sterling: Pluto Press 2002), 22). In other words, there is 
no formal distinction between truth and truthfulness for Deleuze, for the latter presupposes 
the facticity of an object a priori of its expression, an a priori which Deleuze disavows. The 
terms are used here interchangeably. 
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world in favour of an event-oriented ontology, which treats mind and 
world as aspects of events however, I was asked to account for how 
any claim to truth could be made of things²including truth itself²that 
are constantly changing as they are expressed by the event. How, in 
other words, can Deleuze account for the truth of the production of 
truth? 
In response to these two problems, this paper makes two claims. 
Firstly, it shows that thinking the truth of any particular concept (such 
as politics) is founded upon an instrumental logic that betrays the truth 
of a situation. Truth cannot be thought ¶RI VRPHWKLQJ· for this would 
fall back into a theory of correspondence. Instead, truth is a function 
of thought. In order to make this move to a functional concept of 
truth, I outline 'HZH\·V criticism, and two important repercussions, of 
dogmatically instrumental philosophy. I then show how %DGLRX·V 
philosophy is indeed guilty of instrumentalisation, but emphasise that 
his prioritisation of truth is nevertheless important to maintain. The 
second claim this paper makes is that the criticism of 'HOHX]H·V 
conception of truth as circular is misplaced, as it is founded on the 
assumption that Deleuze conceptualises the truth of objects. Instead, I 
show that, for Deleuze, truth is not a property of an object but of its 
production. To reach this conclusion, I develop what I call Dewey·V 
account of pragmatic instrumentalisation (as opposed to the dogmatic 
instrumentalisation he criticises) into 'HOHX]H·V concepttuali-sation of 
truth as the process of making sense of our precarious world. I 
conclude by making some provisional remarks that 'HOHX]H·V 
pragmatic account of truth paves the way for an ethics that is not 
founded on truths it cannot explain (i.e. God or mathematics), but as 
an ongoing, subversive practice. 
 
Instrumentalisation 
In Experience and Nature, John Dewey argues that, hitherto, all 
philosophy has been constituted around the principle of 
instrumentalisation, whereby concepts are developed as part of an 
attempt to understand the world in service of a cause. Importantly for 
Dewey, prefiguring AlthXVVHU·V concept of ÄGHQHJDWLRQ· this cause is 
rarely admitted to be part of the process of instrumentalisation. He 
shows this philosophical lineage tracing back to Platonic inspiration 
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and the appropriation of artisanship by ancient philosophy. 6  By 
instrumentalising the world with both the Platonic ideal form and 
$ULVWRWOH·V efficient and final causes, objects are appropriated by 
philosophy in an attempt to reduce the world to a set of properties 
which both Plato and Aristotle could articulate to suit their political 
goals. As developed below, the point I want to make here is not that it 
is necessarily an issue to appropriate thought for a purpose, but that 
that purpose must not be dogmatic.  
The upshot of dogmatic intellectual appropriation of the world is 
two-fold. Firstly, as Sleeper puts it, this appropriation ¶LV the root cause 
of the dualisms that litter the train of Western thought from Plato to 
positivism, driving conceptual wedges between matter and form, body 
and mind, fact and YDOXH· 7  Were it not for the ¶FRQWHPSODWLRQ of 
eternal truths dimly perceived as somehow transcending and 
governing the confusing world of the live FUHDWXUH· he argues we 
could ¶HYROYH our first philosophy from the logic of experience, from 
the analysis of existential problems and their means of UHVROXWLRQ·8 In 
other words, Dewey accuses the entire tradition of Western 
metaphysics of setting out from first principles that it cannot²or will 
not²account for, and the resultant construction of abstract claims 
upon false dualities, such as dialectics. 9  Secondly, the 
instrumentalisation of the intellect serves a management function, with 
the mode of management matching the mode of instrumentalisation. 
In service of this intellectual appropriation, as Dewey argues, self-
evidence ceases to be important for developing new ideas and, if new 
phenomena destabilise the existing philosophical postulates, they are 
cast aside, re-presented or disregarded in favour of efficient 
management.10 
To support his claim, Dewey highlights PDQNLQG·V experiences of 
an existentially precarious world, where the precarity of existence must 
be accounted for metaphysically to the same extent as its stability.11 
Precarity is not an empirical observation²Dewey would not argue, for 
                                                 
6 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 128. 
7 R. W. Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 136. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 46-47; Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism, 114-117. 
10 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 130. 
11 Ibid., 40-44. 
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example, that 1929 is any more precarious than 1928²but a 
metaphysical claim. Situations that individuals find themselves in are, 
for Dewey, not wholly comprehensible because they are presented to 
the individual by a partial encounter. 12  For example, a VWXGHQW·V 
experience of a classroom might be constituted by the interaction with 
their teacher, their peers and the classroom geography, but this would 
only be a contingent and local presentation of the larger situation 
which would include government targets for syllabuses and University 
budgets. For Dewey then, an individual encounters a situation into 
which they enquire. This encounter forms the antecedent conditions 
for this inquiry, yet the situation that the individual encounters extends 
much further than is presented to the individual. It is this extension 
into what is not presented to the individual that constitutes the 
VLWXDWLRQ·V precarity, whilst the learned intellect immanently constitutes 
the VLWXDWLRQ·V stability. The encounter between thought and a situation 
is important for 'HOHX]H·V conceptualisation of truth and will be 
expanded on below but, first, what is the problem with the dogmatic 
intellectualisation of the world, as undertaken by Badiou and Jones? 
 
Dogma 
The weight of %DGLRX·V political prescriptions relies entirely upon their 
(rational, axiomatic) subtraction from both doxa (opinion) and the 
sensible. 13  Using the mathematical apparatus of ZFC set theory, 
%DGLRX·V intellectual project is to ¶PLOLWDQWO\ pursue the severing of the 
infinite from the One, making it impossible to reappropriate the 
IRUPHU· thus affirming ¶WKH pure one-less infinity of the multiple as 
VXFK·14 Put in 'HZH\·V terms, Badiou wishes to affirm precarity as 
that which conditions our potentially infinite ability to act as we may 
want, were it not concealed by our petty human sensibilities (i.e. doxa 
or the ¶2QH· %DGLRX·V revelation proceeds by reversing the Platonic 
priority of the One over the multiple and infinite, and demonstrating 
how the infinite can be accessed despite the One. So, in certain 
                                                 
12 J. Dewey, Logic: Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, 1938), 106. 
13 See also: P Hallward Badiou: A Subject to Truth. Minneapolis and London (University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), 93-106; A. Badiou, Metapolitics (London and New York: Verso, 2005), 
especially ch. 10; and S. Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of commitment, politics of resistance 
(London and Brooklyn: Verso, 2008). 
14 F. Gironi, Naturalising Badiou: Mathematical Ontology and Structural Realism (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 32. 
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situations, the presented order of things is ruptured in an event which 
allows the faithful to act in accordance with the teachings of that 
event.15 It is here that %DGLRX·V project looks remarkably similar to 
-RQHV· who also thinks that proclaiming fidelity to an inaccessible 
realm from which truth can be articulated is a necessary part of a 
political account of legitimacy. However, as others have also noted, 
%DGLRX·V ontology also relies upon epistemological propositions that 
both reduce and secularise his conception of the infinite. 16  The 
distinctions that Badiou uses in order to elucidate his ontology²those 
of truth/doxa, intelligible/sensible and is/is not²are denegated, ideal 
postulates that condition his ontology before being re-introduced as 
symptoms of it.17 So, %DGLRX·V ontology does fall to 'HZH\·V criticism 
of instrumentalisation: Badiou instrumentalises thought in a circular 
argument which declares that this instrumentalisation is a product of 
the ontology it specifies.  
The circular problem of %DGLRX·V mathematical ontology can be 
put more generally: any philosophy which purports to tell the truth of 
something (including the world itself, or the propositional form of a 
truth statement) instantiates an ontological duality between truth as the 
truth of some-thing and anything else which is not that some-thing. As 
a result, it must also admit to not being able to tell the truth of what is 
not that thing. Indeed, the four main theories of truth (coherence, 
correspondence, pragmatist and deflationary), as well as %DGLRX·V and 
-RQHV· theories, make claims about either the truth of the form of 
propositions, sentences or claims, or of the world. 18  Because each 
theory specifies its own remit, it cannot explain the truth of what it 
does not specify and, most importantly, this includes the ability to tell 
the truth of the mind/world differentiation that is implicit (and often 
                                                 
15 A. Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2011), 52-59. 
16 See S. äiåek, The Ticklish Subject (London and New York: Verso, 2000), 127-170; A. 
Badiou, Theoretical Writings (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 260; F. Laruelle, 
Anti-Badiou: The Introduction of Maoism Into Philosophy (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 111-118; Gironi, Naturalising Badiou, 13. 
17 Laruelle, Anti-Badiou, 115;  D. Sacilotto, "Towards a Materialist Rationalism: Plato, Hegel, 
Badiou", Badiou Studies, 2(1), 2013. 
18 See F. F. Schmitt, Theories of Truth (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell, 2004), 1-31; 
See also A. Parr (ed.), The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010), 292-293. Others have reduced this list simply down to ¶EHOLHIV· (See 
A. G. Burgess and J. P. Burgess, Truth. Princeton and Woodstock (Princeton University Press, 
2011) 3). 
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explicit) in all of the theories. Furthermore, the mind/world split 
necessitates that the mind either form a perspective of the world (such 
as in correlationist theories of truth) or form judgements of 
perspectives (such as in coherence theories). According to this 
necessity, traditional theories of truth result in an unreconcilable 
differentiation between different truth claims, where different subjects 
will have different perspectives or judgements from each other. 
Although Badiou rightly avoids traditional, propositional theories of 
truths, in his case the circularity is to be found within his ¶WUXWK 
SURFHGXUH· i.e. in the distinction between the truth of non-being (the 
void) and not the truth of being (the sensible/opinion). Badiou states 
what the truth can be told of and proceeds to elaborate how we may 
do this.19 In all cases, however, it is hard to accept theories of truth 
that limit the remit of their application by prescription. If the concept 
of truth is to be held on to, what is needed is an ambitious account of 
truth that can account for everything, including its own account of the 
truth. 
 
Truth as function 
It is often supposed that contemporary philosophy shies away from 
conceptualising the truth, if it does not reject the concept entirely, for 
precisely the problems associated with circularity mentioned above.20 
It might be more productive to focus instead on concepts such as 
equality, representation or stability to ground political claims. Yet, as 
Rorty confirms, philosophers rarely say that there is no truth even if 
they are reported to do so. 21  As contemporary philosophy has 
attempted to move beyond dogmatic metaphysics towards contingent 
structures, truth must also (to a greater or lesser extent) be a functional 
part of contingent structures. Indeed this might explain why 
philosophies that do not focus on truth as the articulation and 
                                                 
19 In particular, see A. Badiou, Logics of Worlds (London and New York: 2009). Badiou 
defines a truth procedure as that which results from an event and conditions the HYHQW·V 
actualisation within subsequent situations. According to Badiou, there are four truth 
procedures (politics, science, art, and love) and, with regards to the political, Badiou claims 
that ¶WKH procedure it engages exhibits a political truth, only under certain FRQGLWLRQV· (A. 
Badiou, Metapolitics (London and New York: Verso, 2005), 145). 
20 N. Gavey, "Feminisit Poststructuralism and Discourse Analysis: Contributions to 
Feminist Psychology", Psychology of Women Quarterly (13), 1989, 462. 
21 R. Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1. 
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exploration of structures understandably take centre stage in place of a 
detailed scrutiny of how structures are constituted. However, if Dewey 
is correct to argue that thought instrumentalises a precarious world, 
then truth must be seen as a concept with which to understand how 
different and changing structures adequately instrumentalise it. The 
¶WUXWK of the PDWWHU· would then not be a description of the world 
under any one particular transcendental description of truth. Instead, 
truth might be thought of as a functional component of the sense that 
understands the world, which appropriates and creates different 
structures as necessary. Dogmatic instrumentalisation becomes 
pragmatic instrumentalisation. This process, whereby the subject 
creates appropriate and adequate structures for its use, is what Dewey 
calls an inquiry into the world and Deleuze calls an apprenticeship.22 
Deleuze·V idea of apprenticeship can be thought of as a practice 
of living truthfully in the world. As opposed to %DGLRX·V and -RQHV· 
conception of truth, which rejects the truth of the world in favour of 
truth found outside it, Deleuze wants us to affirm the world. Yet 
Deleuze is hostile to traditional theories of truth and this is particularly 
clear when he argues that the ¶PLVWDNH of philosophy is to presuppose 
within us a benevolence of thought, a natural love of WUXWK·23 This 
motif, often repeated throughout 'HOHX]H·V work, is a warning against 
those who assume that thought inherently leads to what is good for 
the one who thinks. Thought is not essentially good for the individual 
because it is not totalising; it does not contain all that is necessary to 
know the truth of the world. Were this to be the case, the adequacy of 
thought to the world would necessarily be ¶de jure, and not simply a 
question of IDFW· 24  In other words, proving that thought (and 
therefore truthful statements) contain within them the aptitude to tell 
the truth is a Sisyphean feat: every truth claim must be bolstered by 
                                                 
22 This paper argues that Deleuze, and not Dewey, provides the more suitable 
conceptualisation of truth. 'HZH\·V inquiry is in line with 3RSSHU·V theory of science: it is 
essentially falsificationist. His theory assumes the probability that statements made will not 
be true in the future as one of their preconditions (Dewey, Logic: Theory of Inquiry 345). As 
Nissen develops in a detailed criticism of this conceptualisation of truth however, a 
statement that is true except to the extent that it is not true can hardly be called a truthful 
statement at all (L. Nissen, John Dewey's Theory of Inquiry and Truth (The Hague and Paris: 
Mouton & Co, 1966), 98). Therefore, 'HOHX]H·V conceptualisation is preferable because, for 
him, truth is always true, irrespective of spatio-temporal change. 
23 G. Deleuze, Proust and Signs (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), 11. 
24 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (London: Continuum, 2004), 20. 
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the theory of truth that grounds it, the rules of which, in turn, must be 
re-evaluated in terms of the new claim. It is, however, tautologous to 
suggest that a theory can test its claim according to its own terms. 
Instead of relying on a benevolent and totalising image of thought to 
find the truth, 'HOHX]H·V conceptualisation of truth is functional, and 
Deleuze argues that truth is ¶betrayed by involuntary VLJQV·25 
What does it mean for truth to be betrayed by signs? In order to 
know truth, Deleuze argues that we ¶PXVW first experience the violent 
effect of a sign, and the mind must be ´IRUFHGµ to seek the VLJQ·V 
PHDQLQJ·.26 For Deleuze, the individual encounters situations through 
four kinds of signs that exist in differential relation to each other: 
worldly signs (those of meaning); amorous signs (those that impel one 
to become sensitive to something); sensuous signs (those that give one 
joy or sadness); and artistic signs (signs of pure affectivity). 27  The 
encounter, for Deleuze, forces the individual to understand a situation, 
and this understanding is created in part by the affectivity of signs and 
in part by the VLJQV· relation to thought. There is no truth of the world 
in-itself, as this implies that there are objects a priori of sense to find 
the truth of. Instead, for Deleuze, sense is true if it has been created by 
the individual in synthesis with their previous understanding and what 
they have learned from their encounter with the world. To explain 
this, Deleuze uses the melancholic example of a man who has been 
lied to by his partner, asking, ¶>Z@KR would seek the truth if he had not 
first suffered the agonies inflicted by the EHORYHG·s lies?· 28  The 
deceived is impelled to inquire into the truth, not of the lies that he 
has been told (for these constitute only part of his situation), but 
rather of his wretchedness (i.e. his situation). His sense of the 
situation²his truth²has been betrayed by the encounter, which has 
constituted his melancholy as part of the situation. In this regard, 
'HOHX]H·V idea of truth avoids the circularity found in %DGLRX·V and 
-RQHV· ideas. Truth is not a truth of something (i.e. the world or void), 
and is therefore not open to questions about its limited remit, but it is 
a function of making sense in the world. 
 
                                                 
25 R. Bogue, Deleuze's Wake: Tributes and Tributaries (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2004), 64. See also Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 11. Emphasis mine. 
26 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 16. 
27 Ibid., 1-10. 
28 Ibid., 16. 
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Ethically truthful 
Truth, according to Deleuze, appears to be so far removed from the 
four traditional theories of truth as to disqualify it as being truth at all, 
or at the very least so obscure as to render it redundant.29 So what is to 
be learned from it? There are three points to be taken from 'HOHX]H·V 
conceptualisation of truth. The first is that Deleuze invites us to learn: 
for Deleuze, we are apprentices in the world to the extent that we 
learn about ourselves embodied within precarious situations. Thus, 
when Deleuze argues that ¶WKH condition of truth is not opposed to the 
false, but to the DEVXUG·30 he encourages us to literally make sense of 
otherwise absurd situations. Understandings of situations are not fixed 
before they are encountered, so frittering RQH·V life away as a result of 
being lied to by RQHV· love is not necessary. Instead, one might 
creatively affirm RQH·V own place with respect to the liar; not all lies 
are bad, and learning the truth of the situation makes sense of the lie. 
Secondly, truth is non-propositional, although it may incorporate 
propositions within it. For Deleuze, propositions only tell a partial 
truth²the truth of the proposition²which amounts to no truth at all, 
and he reminds us that ¶WKH truth has no need to be spoken in order to 
be PDQLIHVW·31 Thirdly, and most importantly, truth is both ethical and 
subversive. 32  Through his critique of dogmatic a priori and 
transcendental claims, Deleuze encourages individuals to take an 
active role in their own lives in order to remain open to the 
encounter.33 One must hold attempts to coerce, dominate, control or 
lie to us to account, not for the sake of necessarily rejecting these 
attempts for the sake of it, but to ensure that they benefit us. Deleuze 
encourages us to make sense of dogmatic ideas and, in doing so, think 
of ways we might resist their effect on us.  
                                                 
29 This is indeed the position taken even by the majority of Deleuze scholars who articulate 
their opinions in conversation, though rarely in text. Three notable exceptions to these 
scholars however are Rancière, Djordjevic, and Smith VHH-5DQFLH Ғre and R. Djordjevic 
5DQFLH Ғre, "Is There a Deleuzian Aesthetics?" Qui Parle, 14(2), 2004, 1-14; see also D. W. 
Smith, "Temporality and Truth", Deleuze Studies, 7(3), 2013, 377-389). 
30 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 18. 
31 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 20. 
32 A. Negri, Spinoza for our Time: Politics and Postmodernity (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013), 97-98. 
33 I. Semetsky, "The Problematics of Human Subjectivity: Gilles Deleuze and the Deweyan 
Legacy", Studies in Philosophy and Education, 22(3-4), 2003, 219. 
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Deleuze·V conceptualisation of truth clearly flies in the face of 
traditional theories, %DGLRX·V mathematical truth procedures and 
-RQHV· Schmittian account of a political theology of truth, eschewing 
their penchant for organisational and top-down regulation of thought. 
When politics is presented as a precarious situation to which solutions 
must be found, 'HOHX]H·V theory of truth prompts the individual to 
problematise its apparent obviousness, and pragmatically 
instrumentalise thought to make sense of the situation. 
 
 
